DEE - UC3M Working Papers. Business

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http://dspace.uc3m.es/handle/10016/20355

Esta serie comienza en el año 2015. Es continuación de la serie "UC3M Working papers. Business Economics", ISSN: 2341-0795, del Departamento de Economía de la Empresa de la Universidad Carlos III de Madrid.

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Now showing 1 - 6 of 6

The effect of patent protection on inventor mobility
(2017-05-03) Melero, Eduardo; Palomeras, Neus; Wehrheim, David Alexander; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa
This paper investigates the effect of obtaining a patent on the mobility of employee inventors who are at the beginning of their careers. We suggest that patents make human capital more specific to the employer. As a result, we expect that patenting leads to lower levels of mobility. We draw on U.S. patent application data for the period 2001-2012 to analyze this issue. Using average examiner leniency as an exogenous source of variation in granted patents, we find that one additional patent granted decreases inventor mobility by approximately 25 percent. The estimated negative effect is nearly twice as large for discrete technologies (chemicals and pharmaceuticals) for which patent effectiveness is greater. The effect is also more pronounced in cases where the inventor's knowledge can be independently transferred (e.g., inventors with few coauthors) and for moves concerning technologically similar employers. The results have implications for the effect of patents on knowledge diffusion.
Teaching quality and academic research
(2016-07) Rodríguez, Rosa; Rubio Irigoyen, Gonzalo; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa
This paper studies the relation between teaching quality and research productivity using a detailed database for students in higher education. In order to measure teaching quality, we employ a version of the value-added methodology which uses future performance of students to make inferences about the current teaching quality of their professors. We report a mild but positive and significant relation between publications on top journals and teaching quality. To all practical effects, this finding does not seem to be contaminated by the potential negotiating power of professors with high levels of top publications strategically choosing the best-performing groups. Additionally, we report evidence that the random assignment of students into class groups is reasonably satisfied. Finally, we argue that teaching effectiveness measures based on anonymous student evaluations are suspicious and debatable.
The strategic allocation of inventors to R&D collaborations
(Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa, 2016-03) Palomeras, Neus; Wehrheim, David Alexander
Safeguarding against unintended leakage of valuable knowledge in R&D collaboration requires careful attention to the role of inventors participating in these collaborations. In this paper, we claim that the degree of protection of the knowledge embodied by inventors affects how an opportunistic partner can use this information when technology leakage occurs. The implication is that those inventors whose set of knowledge is more protected are more likely to be assigned to joint activities than their co-workers. By relying on patent ownership and authorship data, we analyze the allocation of inventors to collaborative projects from a sample of large pharmaceutical firms. Our results confirm that inventors are strategically allocated to projects according to their degree of preemptive power.
Liquidity provision: lessons from a natural experiment
(Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa, 2015-07) Bermejo, Vicente J.; Abad, José M.
We study the reaction of more than 60,000 firms to a large unexpected liquidity shock in Spain during a severe recessionary period. The Spanish central government repaid in 2012 almost 30bn euros (approximately 3% of GDP) of arrears that Territorial Administrations had been accumulating for years. We assess the economic impact of the plan using two alternative estimation strategies. First, we use a differences-in-differences (DID) approach that exploits heterogeneity in the size of the liquidity received by firms. Second, we take advantage of the plan's plausibly exogenous disbursement implementation and run a DID procedure using as control group some firms that were paid a year later. Overall, we find that a governmental liquidity injection during a recession increases corporate investment significantly: on average firms use 4% of cash transfers for investment. This effect is stronger for firms with lower default risk and higher investment opportunities. Firms with higher default risk are more prone to repay financial debt. On average, firms use 8% of cash transfers to repay financial debt.
Determinants of the multiple-term structures from interbank rates
(2015-06) Petit, Nuria; Serrano, Pedro; Lafuente Luengo, Juan Ángel; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa
The classic relationship between deposit rates and interest rate derivatives has been fractured since August 2007. Uncertainty in the interbank money market has increased the risk premia differentials on unsecured deposits rates of different tenors, such as Euribor, leading to a new pricing framework of interest rate derivatives based on multiple curves. This article analyzes the economic determinants of this new multi-curve framework. We employ basis swap (BS) spreads &-floating-to-floating interest rate swaps- as instruments for extracting the interest rate curvedifferentials. Our results show that the multi-curve framework mirrors the standard single-curve setting in terms of level, slope and curvature factors. The level factor captures 90% of the total variation in the curves, and this factor significantly covaries with a proxy for systemic risk. Moreover, the curve residuals are significantly correlated with interbank liquidity. Our empirical findings also show unidirectional causality running from risk (and liquidity) to level (and noise) factors.
CEO risk-taking incentives and bank failure during the 2007-2010 financial crisis
(2015-03) Boyallian, Patricia; Ruiz-Verdú, Pablo; Universidad Carlos III de Madrid. Departamento de Economía de la Empresa
We propose a simple measure of the risk-taking incentives of the CEOs of highly levered financial institutions, levered delta, which captures the incentives to take on risk generated by CEOs' stock holdings. Using this measure, we find that stronger CEO risk-taking incentives prior to the 2007-2010 financial crisis are associated with a higher probability of bank failure during the crisis. We find no evidence that risk-taking incentives or bank failure are related to corporate governance failures. However, CEOs' risk-taking incentives appear to be aligned with shareholders' incentivesto shift risk to other claim holders.

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